Journal Title/Source

Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics

Publication Date

2015

Volume

3

Issue (if applicable)

1

Page Numbers

121-137

Document Type

Journal Article

Department

Philosophy

Abstract

I here sketch a reply to Peter van Inwagen’s Rollback Argument, which suggests that libertarian accounts of free agency are beset by problems involving luck. Van Inwagen imagines an indeterministic agent whose universe is repeatedly ‘rolled back’ by God to the time of her choice. Since the agent’s choice is indeterministic, her choices are sometimes different in the imaginary rollback scenarios. I show that although this is true, this need not impair her control over what she does. I develop an account of when and why the fact that an agent would choose differently impairs control, which provides a novel response to the Rollback Argument.

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